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Protecting Consumer Protection:  
Filling the Federal Enforcement Gap 
AMY WIDMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
Since 2014, when a first-of-its-kind empirical study 
looked at how public enforcers use their authority under 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices (“UDAP”) laws, the 
enforcement landscape has changed. Most notably, the 
Trump Administration weakened enforcement on the federal 
level. In the wake of this political shift, many state enforcers 
rushed to fill the gap left by weak federal enforcement. At the 
same time, the state enforcers themselves experienced changes 
both internal (including changes to budgets and stated policy 
priorities) and external (electoral changes regarding state 
Attorneys General, changes to statutory authority, and other 
changes governing the enforcer’s authority). 
 
†Associate Clinical Professor Rutgers Law School. The author previously served 
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This article presents findings from a follow-up study 
examining the public UDAP enforcement landscape in 2018. 
The principal finding is that states employed substantially 
the same strategies toward UDAP enforcement in 2018 as they 
did in 2014. This finding validates the central observation of 
both years’ studies of state UDAP enforcement: states can be 
characterized by distinct strategies of consumer protection 
enforcement. 
This information alone offers insight into the remarkable 
stability of state UDAP enforcement, even across varied 
strategies and a changing landscape. Other findings also 
begin to shed light on how states might react to extreme 
changes in enforcement on the federal level. For example, even 
though six states have made public statements backed by 
concrete actions to attempt to fill an enforcement gap left by 
the absence of federal action, state enforcement case volumes 
were up among all states. Public compensation, however, was 
down among all types of enforcement actions in 2018. 
Finally, comparisons of enforcement case volumes and 
strategies across states that experienced other changes over 
the time period—changes in leadership and statutory 
authority, for example—mirrored the overall trend of an 
increase in enforcement coupled with general strategic 
stability. Strategies as a whole do not seem closely aligned 
with partisan politics. 
This study creates a needed point of comparison to the 
2014 data, allowing stakeholders to ask deeper questions 
about how public enforcers should wield their discretion and 
authority to resolve consumer protection cases. With debt 
levels in America at an all-time high, and federal enforcement 
of consumer law at an all-time low, research-based action is 
urgently needed to sharpen our understanding of the role and 
potential effectiveness of institutions tasked with protecting 
consumers from fraudulent lending schemes and oppressive 
debt collection strategies as well as the myriad other types of 
consumer scams that lead Americans toward more debt. The 
data here give state officials and state-based reformers the 
2021] PROTECTING CONSUMER PROTECTION 1159 
information needed to maximize enforcement in a way that 
improves consumers’ lives. 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans are drowning in debt. 
A report from the Pew Charitable Trust has observed 
that “[d]ebt is particularly problematic for low-income 
households, whose liabilities grew far faster than their 
income in the aftermath of the recession: [t]heir debt was 
equal to just one-fifth of their income in 2007, but that 
proportion had ballooned to half by 2013.”1 In a 2017 Harris 
Poll survey of adults in the United States regarding the 
factors that led them to credit card debt, a third of 
respondents pointed to costs of necessities not covered by 
household income.2 Individuals, families, and communities 
of color carry disproportionately large amounts of debt 
relative to other segments of the population.3 
In our modern society, debt stems from many causes, 
including home mortgages, medical emergencies, school 
loans, automobile and other commercial purpose loans, 
credit card accruals, and more.4 The necessities that people 
must pay for, but cannot afford to buy outright, create 
specific vulnerability. People in desperate circumstances due 
to pressing needs, often already in debt from past choices, are 
routinely targeted by companies who promote additional 
debt through payday loans, foreclosure mortgages, debt 
consolidation services, and other strategies. These structures 
 
 1. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE COMPLEX STORY OF AMERICAN DEBT: 
LIABILITIES IN FAMILY BALANCE SHEETS 1 (2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org 
/~/media/assets/2015/07/reach-of-debt-report_artfinal.pdf?la=en. 
 2. Erin El Issa, 2017 American Household Credit Card Debt Study, 
NERDWALLET, https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/credit-card-data/household-
credit-card-debt-study-2017/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2020). 
 3. See GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO, NEW YORK STATE: MAKING PROGRESS 
HAPPEN 130–31 (2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files 
/atoms/files/2020StateoftheStateBook.pdf. 
 4. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 1, at 2. 
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often rely on high interest rates that only the desperate 
would agree to pay and on incrementally timed repayment 
obligations that, because they are hard to discern or seem 
distant in effect, will typically cost borrowers far more than 
they anticipated at the time of the loan.5 These 
circumstances are only being amplified by the COVID-19 
pandemic.6 
Public enforcement of laws against fraudulent practices 
should be a crucial tool to help people contend with the 
scammers. Shutting down fraudulent practices and 
returning consumer money, especially when defendants prey 
on people already in debt or catapult people into debt 
through unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices, is a 
primary activity of government.7 Laws protecting consumers 
from this type of fraudulent behavior have been codified for 
close to 100 years.8 
The federal government, however, abandoned its 
enforcement role under the Trump Administration. In the 
traditional consumer protection regulatory scheme, federal 
agencies enforce federal laws and work concurrently with 
states on enforcement of federal laws.9 States also have their 
 
 5. See, e.g., What to Know About Payday and Car Title Loans, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0097-payday-loans (last visited 
June 27, 2021). 
 6. See, e.g., Rich Cordray, White Paper: Immediate Actions for CFPB to 
Address COVID-19 Crisis (Apr. 6, 2020), https://medium.com/@RichCordray 
/cfpbwhitepaper-193a5aed0d75 (“Scams are already popping up around testing 
and treatment; financial scams will shortly follow, such as phishing scams 
demanding sensitive banking and financial information to get stimulus funds, or 
phony offers of loss mitigation or credit repair assistance.”). 
 7. See Craig Cowie, Putting Money Back into Consumers’ Pockets: An 
Empirical Study of the CFPB’s Civil Penalty Fund, 2021 ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1424–
27 (2021). 
 8. See Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58); Prentiss Cox et al., Strategies 
of Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37, 42–43 (2018). 
 9. Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General’s Use of Concurrent 
Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 53, 53–58 (2011). 
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own state consumer protection laws and enforcement 
practices that are, in many cases, modeled on federal laws.10 
Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”) Mick Mulvaney, appointed in November 
2017, immediately stepped back from enforcement and 
announced the agency would leave it up to state entities to 
fill the gap.11 The CFPB is one of two federal agencies 
charged with protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive practices; the other is the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”).12 Though the FTC has played a vital enforcement 
role, its ability to receive monetary compensation for 
consumers through its enforcement actions was recently 
curtailed by the Supreme Court.13 
 
 10. See CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L. CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN 
THE STATES 10 (2018), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf. 
 11. See Allison Schoenthal, Insight: A Shift in Regulation from the CFPB to 
the States, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 24, 2018, 9:33 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw 
.com/banking-law/insight-a-shift-in-regulation-from-the-cfpb-to-the-states; see 
also Mick Mulvaney, The CFPB has Pushed Its Last Envelope, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
23, 2018, 7:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-cfpb-has-pushed-its-last-
envelope-1516743561 (“We will exercise . . . the almost unparalleled power 
Congress has bestowed on us to enforce the law faithfully in furtherance of our 
mandate. But we go no further. The days of aggressively ‘pushing the envelope’ 
are over.”); Pamela Banks, Actions Taken by Acting CFPB Director Mick 
Mulvaney that Undermine the CFPB’s Ability to Protect Consumers, CONSUMER 
REPORTS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/actions-
taken-by-acting-cfpb-director-mick-mulvaney-that-undermine-the-cfpbs-ability-
to-protect-consumers/. 
 12. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
1 (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation 
_agreements/ftc-cfpb_mou_225_0.pdf. 
 13. See AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1344 (2021). Congress 
is currently considering legislation to reinstate these powers. See, e.g., Consumer 
Protection and Recovery Act, H.R. 2668, 117th Cong. (2021). FTC Testifies at an 
Oversight Hearing Before the Senate Commerce Committee, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/08/ftc-
testifies-oversight-hearing-senate-commerce-committee (“Over the past four 
fiscal years, pursuant to section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the FTC has returned more 
than $975 million directly to consumers and won judgments under which 
consumers received nearly $10 billion more through defendant-administered 
redress programs. However, the Commission’s ability to keep getting such results 
for consumers has been threatened or curtailed by recent judicial decisions.”). 
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States are not particularly well-suited to fill the 
consumer protection gap that is being created by the current 
CFPB’s change in strategy and compounded by threats to the 
FTC’s authority. Enforcement levels among the states vary, 
and roughly a third of states bring few or no consumer 
enforcement actions.14 Moreover, state resources are not as 
deep as federal coffers. Going forward, the problem could be 
additionally compounded by new laws that might preempt 
states from enforcing federal consumer laws at all.15 
Even if state enforcers might not be particularly well-
suited to fill the gap, they remain the best option. The 
weakening of federal enforcement brought on by the Trump 
Administration combines with the uneven nature of state 
enforcement to bad effect. Deceptive actors flourish in this 
environment, entangling people in a cycle of debt in which 
they borrow more money to pay what they already owe.16 
This cycle pushes increasing numbers of people into poverty. 
The solution is plain: we must deepen the engagement of 
federal enforcement authorities and strengthen state 
enforcement authorities. Data are essential to both these 
goals. 
I. WHY IS UDAP SO IMPORTANT? 
Laws that hold bad actors accountable for fraudulent 
behavior in the marketplace should be potent weapons in the 
fight against poverty. Laws focused on unfair and deceptive 
 
 14. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 88. 
 15. For example, during the Trump Administration, Justice Department 
officials and former Education Secretary Betsy DeVos asserted that states are 
preempted from enforcing federal consumer protection laws that would protect 
individuals against agencies seeking to collect on federal student loans. See 
Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s 
Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 48, 10619 (Mar. 12, 2018). 
 16. See, e.g., THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., HOW DEBT COLLECTORS ARE 
TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF STATE COURTS 17 (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2020/06/debt-collectors-to-
consumers.pdf. 
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acts have been pillars of consumer protection strategies for 
close to 100 years. These UDAP laws provide a key 
regulatory structure to keep the marketplace fair. But laws 
themselves do not fix the problem. Effective enforcement of 
those laws is the key. 
For purposes of this study, and the previous 2014 study 
it draws on for comparison, the focus is narrowly drawn on 
the main federal and state laws governing unfair, deceptive, 
and abusive practices. UDAP laws are predominantly 
“principles-based” laws.17 Such laws are meant to be flexible 
in order to adapt to new scams and, in theory, give enforcers 
broad discretion to enforce the laws against ever-changing 
fraudulent schemes. This discretion, however, can 
undermine uniformity, and this potential for variation forms 
the crux of the criticism against UDAP laws: critics charge 
that the economic marketplace isn’t provided adequate 
notice as to which actions will be deemed “unfair” or 
“deceptive” (or, in some cases, “abusive”).18 This criticism is, 
at best, overly simplistic, or worse, deliberately misleading. 
There is quite a bit of consistency in the types of scams that 
are prosecuted.19 The discretion, as it is applied, seems to be 
about whether or not to deploy resources for any particular 
enforcement and, if so, which violations to prioritize. Part of 
this choice seems dependent on the larger enforcement 
landscape and whether other enforcers might be better 
suited to target certain defendants. The data described below 
sketch that larger landscape to provide more context to any 
 
 17. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 44 (citing Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model 
of Rules, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–23 (1967)) (using the term “principles-based” 
to describe a more flexible type of legislative command or “a standard that is to 
be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, political, or social 
situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness 
of some other dimension of morality”). 
 18. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNPRINCIPLED 
PROSECUTION: ABUSE OF POWER AND PROFITEERING IN THE NEW “LITIGATION 
SWARM” 1–2 (2014), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads 
/media/unprincipled-prosecution.pdf. 
 19. See Cox et al. supra note 8, at 65–66. 
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study of enforcement. 
A. The Federal Laws 
There are many federal consumer protection-focused 
laws and regulations, and the legislative framework reveals 
an intricate relationship among these laws. The main federal 
laws regulating unfair and deceptive practices are the 
Federal Trade Commission Act and Consumer Financial 
Protection Act, otherwise known as “Dodd-Frank.”20 
The Federal Trade Commission Act created the Federal 
Trade Commission.21 Section 45(a) of this Act (known as 
“section 5”) provides that “[u]nfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce . . . are . . . declared 
unlawful.”22 It is under this authority that the FTC enforces 
UDAP violations, within the statutory boundaries around 
the types of industries covered. The FTC Act authorizes 
enforcement against mortgage companies, mortgage brokers, 
debt collectors, and creditors.23 Importantly though, the FTC 
is not authorized to enforce the FTC Act against banks, 
federal credit unions, and savings and loan institutions.24 
The FTC is authorized to seek a variety of remedies through 
settlement, but its administrative powers are restricted to 
injunctive relief only.25 
The Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”) 
created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and 
 
 20. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018); Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2018). 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 41. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
 23. See id. 
 24. For a summary of agency jurisdiction to enforce UDAP against banks, see 
Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General 
After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 120 (2013). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), (m); 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). But see FTC v. Credit Bureau 
Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that “[s]ection 13(b)’s grant 
of authority to order injunctive relief does not implicitly authorize an award of 
restitution”). 
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authorized the new agency to enforce multiple federal 
consumer protection laws in addition to the expanded 
“unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]” 
(“UDAAP”) prohibition within the CFPA itself. The Bureau 
is also authorized to issue regulations under this authority.26 
While the CFPB and the FTC share enforcement powers 
in many of these areas, the CFPB has a wider reach than the 
FTC. The CFPB is authorized to enforce prohibitions against 
banking institutions.27 Moreover, the CFPB’s enforcement 
authority goes beyond deceptive and unfair practices, to also 
include a newer category of abusive practices.28 The CFPB is 
authorized to seek a variety of remedies through both 
administrative and judicial action, including injunctions, 
public compensation, and civil penalties.29 Like section 5 of 
the FTC Act, however, there is no concurrent private right of 
action. 
B. The State Laws 
Consumer protection standard-setting and enforcement 
contains multiple vertical layers and a history of both 
concurrent and collegial federalism. As in the federal system, 
states also have a variety of consumer protection laws and 
regulations at their disposal. The two studies compared here 
relied on data drawn from enforcement of the main state 
UDAP laws. These laws have various informal names, but all 
are modeled in part after section 5 of the FTC Act.30 
 
 26. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a); 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)–(b). 
 27. 12 U.S.C. § 5515. 
 28. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a), (d). For more on how the CFPB has used its expanded 
authority to target abusive acts, see Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. 
REV. 1057, 1099–1101 (2016). 
 29. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2). 
 30. See Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and 
Private Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 ANTITRUST 
L. J. 911, 912 (2017); see generally CARTER, supra note 10. 
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The main shared features of the state consumer 
protection acts include prohibitions against deceptive 
practices in consumer transactions and authority vested in 
the state to enforce violations,31 coupled with authority for a 
private right of action.32 Each state statute also provides a 
remedial structure that includes injunctive relief, public 
compensation, and, in all but Rhode Island, civil penalties.33 
Beyond that shared framework, there are variations in 
both the statutory and common law interpretations of the 
statutes that create boundaries around the authority.34 
These variations include substantive differences such as the 
definitions of covered industries or the types of practices that 
are considered deceptive.35 Other substantive variations 
include whether a plaintiff must meet higher thresholds of 
reliance or a heightened burden of proof that the defendant 
 
 31. The vast majority of states locate this authority within the State 
Attorneys General’s office; however, a few states, including Hawaii, Utah, 
Wisconsin, and Connecticut, vest authority in a state consumer agency, either 
alongside or in lieu of the state attorney general (“AG”). See generally NAT’L 
CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50 STATE EVALUATION 
OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS app. C (2018), https://www.nclc.org 
/images/pdf/udap/udap-appC.pdf. However, a few states, including Hawaii, Utah, 
Wisconsin, and Connecticut, vest authority in a state consumer agency, either 
alongside or in lieu of the state attorney general (“AG”). See HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 480-15 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-2-1 (West 2020); WIS. STAT. § 93.06 (2019); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110d (2015). 
 32. See generally NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 31. 
 33. CARTER, supra note 10, at 11, 28. 
 34. For a list of recommendations as to model state legislation that would 
strengthen the scope of state enforcement, see generally CARTER, supra note 10, 
at 48–49 (recommending, for example, that states define unfair and deceptive 
acts broadly, give states rule-making power, expand the industries that are 
covered, remove intent or knowledge requirements, clarify presumptions on 
reliance, increase civil penalty size, allow attorneys’ fees, give states more 
investigatory powers, and adequately fund the state consumer protection 
priorities). 
 35. Compare, e.g., IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(1) (2019) (explicitly exempting 
insurance companies from UDAP enforcement), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 17.46 (West 2019) (explicitly stating that a violation of state unfair 
insurance practices act is a UDAP violation). 
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acted knowingly or intentionally.36 Procedural variations 
also exist. These obstacles, for example, require advance 
notice to defendants, proof of tangible injury, and cap the 
amount of any civil penalties.37 
II. THE 2014 FINDINGS 
A. The Federal Enforcers 
The newly constituted CFPB resolved a total of ten 
UDAAP-based enforcement actions in 2014.38 The agency 
focused on sellers of credit/banking products.39 That year, the 
CFPB received all forms of relief in each case.40 Strikingly, 
this means that the CFPB received public compensation in 
100% of its resolved cases in 2014.41 The compensation was 
typically distributed to all affected consumers.42 The CFPB 
tended to focus its injunctive relief on customer 
service/employee training provisions.43 Every case also 
resulted in a civil penalty, directed to the Bureau’s Civil 
Penalty Fund.44 The amount of money collected in civil 
penalties by the CFPB was greater than that collected by any 
other single enforcer—the only greater collection resulted 
from large, multi-enforcer actions.45 
 
 36. Compare, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-02 (2015) (forbidding practices 
regardless of actual reliance), with IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (2020) (authorizing 
private right of action only for “[a] person relying upon an uncured on incurable 
deceptive act.”). 
 37. See CARTER, supra note 10, at 40–43. 
 38. Id. at 80. 
 39. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 65. 
 40. Id. at 70. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 76. 
 43. Id. at 72. 
 44. Id. at 73. 
 45. See id. at 74. As Craig Cowie points out in his study of the CFPB Civil 
Penalty Fund, this money is mostly paid out to harmed consumers. See Cowie, 
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The FTC resolved a total of ninety-four UDAP-based 
enforcement actions in 2014.46 The FTC employed two 
distinct strategies.47 The first, Type A, was the most 
common.48 These actions were administrative enforcement 
actions for injunctive relief brought against large 
companies.49 Type B actions were initiated in a judicial 
forum against multiple, smaller defendants and aimed 
toward stopping a widespread fraudulent practice.50 In these 
cases, the FTC was able to obtain monetary relief in addition 
to injunctive relief.51 The most notable FTC remedy in the 
Type B cases was some form of asset freeze that would 
dismantle the fraudulent scheme.52 The FTC injunctions 
repeatedly focused on limiting the gathering and using of 
customer data.53 
As described above, federal enforcers played a key role in 
the larger enforcement landscape. Each federal enforcer has 
a slightly different statutory reach and focus, and the CFPB 
was designed to expand and strengthen federal enforcement 
in areas beyond the FTC’s powers.54 The CFPB’s powers were 
clearly effective: no other enforcer was able to stop the 
fraudulent practice, punish the fraudulent actor, and return 
 
supra note 7, at 1424–27. 
 46. See id. at 80–81. 
 47. Id. at 80. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 80–81. In its most recent term, the Supreme Court declared decades 
of FTC practice as contrary to statutory authority and held section 13(b) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act does not “authorize[] the [Federal Trade] 
Commission to seek, and a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as 
restitution or disgorgement.” AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 
1344 (2021). This ruling effectively bars the FTC from the remedy noted in the 
above text. 
 52. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 82–83. 
 53. See id. at 72. 
 54. This Article’s 2018 study only addresses the CFPB. 
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money to affected consumers in each case.55 Moreover, the 
statutory authority to enforce against banks and other 
sellers of credit filled a unique gap. The large size of 
defendants and the scale of the fraudulent practices that the 
CFPB targeted, seen in the data by the large civil penalty 
awards, show an enforcement strategy able to stop the 
biggest and most disruptive—and therefore most 
dangerous—frauds.56 
The only other structure or entity able to marshal the 
resources and extend its reach on a scale similar to that of 
the CFPB is the large multi-enforcer action. In 2014, there 
were seven large multi-enforcer cases and another sixteen 
mid-sized multi-enforcer actions resolved by coalitions of 
state and federal enforcers.57 A federal enforcer (either the 
FTC or the CFPB) joined the states in a majority of these 
cases.58 The large multi-enforcer cases were brought against 
very large entity defendants only, including large mortgage, 
telecom, pharmaceutical, and satellite radio companies.59 
While the large multi-enforcer actions most closely align 
with the CFPB strategy, these actions received public 
compensation only about 71% of the time.60 These cases also 
brought in the largest civil penalty amounts of all 
enforcement actions, but only about 85% of the actions 
generated civil penalties.61 
  
 
 55. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 69–70. 
 56. See id. at 80. 
 57. See id. at 58–59. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. at 70. 
 61. Id. 
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B. The State Enforcers 
In 2014, the fifty-one state enforcers (including 
Washington, DC) resolved a total of 671 UDAP-based 
enforcement actions.62 These actions tended to focus on the 
following industries: construction, motor vehicles, 
foreclosure, and vacation/entertainment.63 
While states tended to bring a large volume of cases 
against smaller defendants as compared with the FTC and 
the CFPB, states did target larger defendants at times.64 
Aggregate state enforcement data from 2014 reveals that 
states received injunctions 95% of the time, civil penalties 
roughly 73% of the time, and public compensation roughly 
65% of the time.65 
The 2014 data yielded seven distinct state enforcement 
strategies.66 The first three strategies can be described as 
gradations of no- or low-enforcement. Non-enforcers resolved 
no UDAP cases in 2014, naturally.67 Low-volume 
enforcement states resolved two to five cases.68 This strategy 
resulted in at least one case with monetary relief greater 
than the median level of relief seen among all 671 cases 
studied.69 A few low-volume enforcers earned the title “low-
volume plus” because they resolved between two and ten 
 
 62. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 55–56. Also, note that “states” and “state 
enforcers” throughout this paper will continue to include Washington, DC, as a 
state unless otherwise noted. 
 63. Id. at 66. 
 64. Id. at 61. 
 65. See id. at 70. 
 66. An eighth strategy, which was really not a discernible strategy, was 
labeled an “outsider.” These four states did not fit neatly into any of the seven 
more clearly observable strategies, though each of these four states had their own 
distinct strategic characteristics. For the most part, those unique strategic 
markers also held true in 2018. Id. at 85–86. 
 67. See id. at 84. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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cases, but states in this strategy cohort closed at least one 
large case resulting in monetary relief greater than $1 
million.70 A fourth strategy group of states, “the outsourcers,” 
was also low-volume but shared a couple of distinct 
characteristics: they targeted large companies and received 
only undesignated government money,71 and they were the 
only states that appeared to sometimes incorporate the use 
of outside counsel.72 
The three remaining strategies had larger levels of 
enforcement but different targets, relief, and roles in 
multistate enforcement. The “street cops” brought a large 
number of cases against individuals and small businesses, 
and their cases were characterized by small monetary 
awards to specific consumers or to consumers who filed a 
complaint.73 A subset of street cop enforcers also resolved 
some actions against large defendants with greater 
monetary awards and sometimes froze assets.74 These states, 
“street cop plus” states, also appeared on multistate 
leadership panels.75 Finally, the “heavies” had a high volume 
of cases against both the smaller, localized fraudulent actors 
and also large entities.76 These states also sometimes froze 
assets as a remedy, and they participated in the highest 
percentage of multistate leadership panels.77 
  
 
 70. Id. at 85. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. at 85, 95. 
 75. See id. at 95. 
 76. Id. at 85, 96. 
 77. See id. at 95, 97. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This new study of cases resolved in 2018 was designed to 
follow up on the results from the 2014 study. Given this 
purpose, the methodology followed a similar structure, 
although the number of data points coded was reduced and 
simplified. 
A. Data Collection 
As with the 2014 study, open records requests were sent 
to all state enforcers of UDAP-based consumer protection 
laws. These requests yielded documents for thirty-eight 
states. The remaining thirteen state enforcers (including 
Washington, DC) statutorily limited their production of 
documents to in-state residents, charged a high fee for 
production, or otherwise rendered the documents 
inaccessible. 
Once the documents were gathered, a team of four 
researchers determined which documents were in scope. 
Scope was defined as a judicial or administrative resolution 
of a UDAP claim dated between January 1, 2018, and 
December 31, 2018. Further, scope included only those 
claims involving a principles-based violation of an unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive practice. This means that a state 
enforcement action based on a purely rule-based violation of 
a regulation promulgated under authority granted in the 
state’s UDAP law was considered a “per se” UDAP violation 
and therefore out of scope for this study.78 Any action that 
included an in-scope UDAP claim, regardless of the presence 
of additional claims and even if the additional claims were 
rule-based, was in scope. 
The state data collection period produced a total of 604 
state enforcement actions resolved in 2018 among thirty-
eight states. The Consumer Financial Protection Board 
 
 78. For more on determinations of a “per se” case and typical examples, see 
id. at 54. 
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enforcement actions were located on the agency website.79 In 
2018, the CFPB resolved nine UDAP-based violations. 
B. Study Design and Coding 
As with the 2014 study, the 2018 data was gathered from 
the face of the resolving documents. The information has 
some built-in temporal lags, as the enforcement actions 
included could have been initiated in any prior year. Actions 
initiated in the year of study were not included in the data if 
the action did not also resolve in that calendar year. This 
design allows for a greater understanding of enforcement 
levels and allows for some variation across years. 
The primary research question was whether the 
strategies identified in 2014 held constant. A secondary 
research question was whether having two years of data 
allowed for greater understanding of how internal and 
external changes might affect enforcement strategy. 
A team of three student researchers plus the author 
coded the following information from the face of these 
resolving documents: 
• the form and forum of the resolution; 
• any outside counsel for the enforcement; 
• the unfair or deceptive conduct; 
• the type of product; 
• the presence of other claims; 
• whether injunctive relief was granted and, if so, 
what type of conduct-resolving relief; 
• whether public compensation was obtained and, if 
so, the type, eligibility, and amount; and 
• whether a government money in the form of civil 
penalty, fees/costs, cy pres award, or other 
government money was obtained and, if so, the 
 
 79. See Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited June 
27, 2021). 
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amounts and use of that money. 
The coding followed a detailed code book, originally 
designed and tested to reduce variations among coders in the 
original 2014 data collection.80 Any coding questions were 
discussed and resolved. Coding results were periodically 
checked to control for any variation throughout the coding 
period. Variance was minimal throughout. Cases were coded 
between February and August 2020. 
For each case, researchers coded roughly fifty points of 
information about the case from information on the face of 
the resolving document itself. The researchers also recorded 
roughly fifteen additional points of information on the 
defendants from information in the resolving document, and 
outside databases containing company information, 
including Mergent Intellect, Lexis Company Profiles, and 
Google. Researchers were able to confirm the entity 
defendant company information for roughly half of the 
resolved cases. Indications on the face of the resolving 
document, however, strongly suggested the general size of 
defendant entities clearly enough that it was possible to 
estimate whether target entities tended to be large or small. 
C. Study Limitations 
As with the previous study, there are limitations to the 
data. Ultimately, the data represent a snapshot in time, and 
it is, statistically speaking, a small set of data points. Since 
our study scope only included resolved documents during one 
calendar year, actions that began in 2018 but were not 
resolved would not be included. Thus, part of any particular 
office’s strategy might not necessarily be fully captured, 
especially in times of great flux. This limitation is mitigated, 
however, since we have a snapshot of 2014 for comparison, 
and each single year snapshot actually represents multiple 
years’ work product from the offices studied, because they 
 
 80. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 56–57. 
2021] PROTECTING CONSUMER PROTECTION 1175 
are snapshots not only in time but also through time. 
Another limitation is that the study is not designed to 
capture local enforcement of UDAP violations. Local 
municipalities are a growing source of enforcement, and this 
could very well alter a state strategy and thus affect the 
overall landscape.81 In states with robust local enforcement, 
the state enforcer might reasonably want to encourage this 
vertical enforcement diversity and prioritize accordingly.82 
Finally, a major limitation to the 2018 data is the 
absence of documents from thirteen state enforcers.83 The 
proliferation of limitations on the scope of state freedom of 
information laws made it harder, even from 2014, to gather 
a national picture of enforcement.84 Moreover, the lack of 
freely granted fee waivers for academic researchers 
compounded this problem. The result is a study from a 
majority of states but not all. 
IV. THE 2018 LANDSCAPE 
Since 2014, the enforcement landscape has shifted in 
both major and minor ways. The most obvious and impactful 
shift was the change in federal administration in 2016. For 
purposes of the CFPB, this change took root in late 2017 
when the White House replaced Director Cordray with 
 
 81. See, e.g., Eli Savit, States Empowering Plaintiff Cities, 52 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 581, 583 (2019); Kathleen Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State 
and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1903, 1906 (2013). 
 82. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-4(a)(1)–(3) (2002); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§§ 17203–06 (West 2014); 815 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/7(a)–(b) (West 2008); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-21 (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.020(4) (West 
2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-130 (1985); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.48 
(West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-201(A), 59.1-201.1 (West 2011). 
 83. Eight of the non-responding states were also low or non-enforcers in 2014. 
Because of this, it is unlikely that the number of cases they would have produced 
would have been significant. 
 84. The following states require requesters to be state citizens: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Delaware, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Virginia. See also McBurney v. 
Young, 569 U.S. 221, 222–23 (2013) (upholding Virginia’s resident requirement). 
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Interim Director Mick Mulvaney.85 Director Kathy 
Kraninger replaced Interim Director Mulvaney in December 
2018.86 
Since Director Cordray left his post, there is mounting 
evidence that the agency fundamentally altered its 
enforcement strategies across all its potential enforcement 
actions.87 For example, Chris Peterson points out that the 
CFPB under Trump-appointed leadership quite 
substantially reduced its level of enforcement despite the 
great need expressed through its consumer complaint data.88 
Furthermore, scrutiny of what little enforcement remained 
shows that fewer dollars went to consumers generally 
throughout 2018.89 Although Professor Peterson analyzed all 
enforcement actions, including substantive areas covered by 
federal laws beyond the unfair, deceptive, and abusive 
practices in the CFPA itself, this same pattern holds true for 
its UDAAP enforcement.90 The United States House of 
Representatives Financial Services Committee reported 
 
 85. Pete Schroeder, Trump Names Interim Consumer Agency Head, Likely 
Sparking Showdown, REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://www.reuters 
.com/article/us-cfpb-cordray/trump-names-interim-consumer-agency-head-
likely-sparking-showdown-idUSKBN1DO2KQ. 
 86. Emily Sullivan, Senate Confirms Kathy Kraninger as CFPB Director, NPR 
(Dec. 6, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/06/673222706/senate-
confirms-kathy-kraninger-as-cfpb-director. 
 87. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., DORMANT: 
THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN 
DECLINE 27–28 (2019), https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03 
/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf. See generally STAFF OF H. COMM. ON 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, 116TH CONG., SETTLING FOR NOTHING: HOW KRANINGER’S 
CFPB LEAVES CONSUMERS HIGH AND DRY (Comm. Print 2019). This article was 
written before the Biden Administration took office. Since then, leadership and 
staff changes at the CFPB have focused on building back to pre-Trump 
Administration enforcement level and strategy. 
 88. PETERSON, supra note 87, at 7–10. Beyond the numbers, it is important to 
stress the toll these violations take on consumers. Id. at 8 (“An independent 
textual analysis of the Bureau’s published complaints found that the complaints 
of many consumers contained “markers of anger, fear, frustration, and sadness.”). 
 89. See id. 
 90. Peterson, supra note 28, at 1075. 
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similarly that Trump appointees repeatedly diverged from 
both agency precedent and career lawyer recommendations 
to avoid requiring defendants to reimburse consumers for 
fraudulent acts.91 The data examined in this study continues 
to bear this out. 
The agency’s interim and current directors portrayed the 
shift in enforcement strategy as reigning in an agency that 
had “aggressively ‘push[ed] the envelope’” on enforcement.92 
But a closer look into the details of the shift in strategy 
reveals something altogether different: a change in 
philosophy about whether there should be enforcement at all 
against the particular targets that the CFPB is best-suited 
to address and, if so, whether consumers should be directly 
reimbursed by those who perpetrated the frauds that 
harmed them. 
A. General Findings 2018 
1. The CFPB 
There are some similarities in the data tracking CFPB 
enforcement strategy between 2014 and 2018. In both years, 
cases were resolved against sizable entities, and all cases 
resulted in injunctive relief. In 2014, the CFPB resolved ten 
cases. In 2018, there were nine cases. The similarities, 
however, end there.93 Even though at first glance the level of 
 
 91. See generally STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 116TH CONG., 
SETTLING FOR NOTHING: HOW KRANINGER’S CFPB LEAVES CONSUMERS HIGH AND 
DRY (Comm. Print 2019). 
 92. Mulvaney, supra note 11 (“We will exercise . . . the almost unparalleled 
power Congress has bestowed on us to enforce the law faithfully in furtherance 
of our mandate. But we go no further. The days of aggressively ‘pushing the 
envelope’ are over.”). 
 93. Multiple accounts portray an agency pursuing a political strategy over all 
else. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., How Trump Appointees Curbed a 
Consumer Protection Agency Loathed by the GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018, 4:16 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-trump-appointees-
curbed-a-consumer-protection-agency-loathed-by-the-gop/2018/12/04/3cb6cd56-
de20-11e8-aa33-53bad9a881e8_story.html (“Some of the cases that did go 
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enforcement looks similar, this is not the case once one takes 
the view from the overall timeline of the agency.94 And, while 
the 2014 CFPB strategy was characterized by the agency 
receiving all forms of relief provided under Dodd-Frank for 
100% of resolved cases, the agency pursued public 
compensation and civil penalties in fewer cases in 2018. Only 
56% of resolved cases in 2018 resulted in any public 
compensation, and the amounts were significantly lower.95 
The mean amount of public compensation earned through 
UDAAP enforcement in 2014 was roughly $21 million;96 but, 
in 2018, the mean dropped to just over $1 million. 
Beyond public compensation, the 2018 enforcement 
actions realized civil penalties only 89% of the time, and 
those penalty amounts tended to be lower as well.97 
Excluding one extreme outlier—one case in 2018, against 
Wells Fargo, received a civil penalty of $500 million—the 
mean UDAAP civil penalty dropped from roughly $6 million 
in 2014 to $1 million in 2018.98 
2. The States 
Comparing the enforcement levels for the thirty-eight 
states for which there was available data for both 2014 and 
 
forward were drained of vigor, with penalties that fell far below what career 
regulators recommended, employees said. The new pattern gave rise to a phrase 
among staff: ‘The Mulvaney Discount.’”). 
 94. Looking at CFPB enforcement over the trajectory of the Bureau’s lifespan, 
a bell curve emerges where cases resolved in 2014 were smaller due to the 
Bureau’s recent formation. The bell curve peaks in 2015–2016 before beginning 
a downward curve. See generally Peterson, supra note 28; PETERSON, supra note 
87. 
 95. Only one case resolved in 2018 earned over $1 million for consumers. See 
Santander Consumer USA, Inc., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/santander-consumer-
usa-inc/ (last visited June 27, 2021). 
 96. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 56–57. 
 97. Dodd-Frank directs all civil penalties to be deposited in the Civil Penalty 
Fund. See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.100–110 (2016). 
 98. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 75 (showing CFPB’s mean net government 
money was roughly $6 million). 
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2018, enforcement levels stayed relatively the same. Using 
data from just these thirty-eight states, there were 555 
enforcement actions resolved in 2014 as compared to 604 
enforcement actions resolved in 2018, for an overall increase 
of 9%. On average, enforcement case volume change per state 
was up 23%, but this includes a wide range of variances 
among the states.99 The largest percentage enforcement 
increase was 509%, which increased enforcement by fifty-six 
cases (from eleven cases in 2014 to sixty-seven cases in 
2018).100 The largest percentage enforcement decrease was 
seen in three low enforcement states that went from one or 
two enforcement actions in 2014 to no enforcement actions in 
2018.101 Within these thirty-eight states, enforcement case 
volume levels were the same or up in nineteen states. Of the 
remaining nineteen states, enforcement levels were down by 
two or fewer actions in eight states. 
The types of relief states pursued in 2018 show some 
slight differences from 2014. Injunctions were slightly more 
prevalent, the number of cases receiving public 
compensation was down, and government money was 
received slightly more often in 2018. 
States received all three forms of relief in 36% of cases, 
compared to 46% in 2014. Injunctive relief remained 
overwhelmingly common, increasing even more in 2018 to 
over 99% of cases resulting in some form of injunctive relief, 
compared to 95% in 2014. The type of injunctive relief 
preferred by states overall remained similar: general 
prohibitions on violating UDAP laws and some form of 
business ban were the most common forms of injunctive 
relief in both years studied.102 
 
 99. This calculation also does not include the percentage increase for two 
states (DC and Kentucky) that had zero enforcement actions in 2014 but five to 
six in 2018. See id. at 88. 
 100. This state was New Jersey. See also discussion infra Section IV.A.2.b.i. 
 101. Louisiana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina each had a 100% decrease in 
enforcement. 
 102. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 72. 
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In the 2018 data, public compensation was awarded in 
51% of non-default cases, down from the 2014 percentage of 
65%.103 Although acknowledging public compensation 
awarded, the resolving documents did not always specify a 
dollar amount. Of the documents with a specified dollar 
amount for public compensation in non-default cases, the 
mean amount in 2018 was $560,219, compared to $370,000 
in 2014.104 
Cases in 2018 resulted in money awarded to the 
government 77% of the time, up slightly from 73% in 2014.105 
Variations among state statutes in civil penalty amounts and 
provisions for awarding fees/costs, however, make this a 
difficult area in which to compare dollar amounts among 
states meaningfully.106 
Most strikingly, the overall enforcement strategies 
displayed in 2014 remained the same in 2018. Enforcement 
levels were up overall, which bumped some states into a 
slightly higher enforcement strategy band. And the use of 
outside counsel, as observable from the resolving documents, 
also decreased overall. Although nine total cases evidenced 
outside counsel in the resolving documents in 2014, only one 
case in 2018 appeared to incorporate the use of outside 
counsel for the state. Three states formerly in the 
“outsourcer” strategy therefore changed to a new strategy, 
either as a non-enforcer or a low-volume enforcer. Generally, 
however, strategy type—which is a function of not only level 
of enforcement but also size of defendant, types of relief 
 
 103. Id. at 70–73. As with the 2014 data, the public compensation calculations 
are made from the non-default cases only. This is because default cases are 
unlikely to produce that money, and the concern here is how many dollars are 
going back to consumers. 
 104. Id. at 78. As with the 2014 data, often resolving documents specify that 
public compensation is obtained but do not list a dollar amount, either because 
the total compensation amount is unknown or variable among consumers. The 
percentage of cases with a known, specified dollar amount of public compensation 
is 66% of public compensation cases. 
 105. Id. at 73. 
 106. See CARTER, supra note 10, at 16–22. 
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sought, and leadership in multistate cases—remained 
remarkably consistent. 
a. Control Group States 
For a baseline comparison between 2014 and 2018, the 
current study further compared the results for each year in 
states, representing all strategies, where there were no 
discernible internal or external changes between the two 
study periods. For these control group states, fourteen in all, 
there was no change in state Attorney General (“AG”) 
leadership (even if a new term), no changes to statutory 
authority (either through legislative or common law 
developments), no structural changes as to the authority of 
the enforcer, and no public announcement of internal 
prioritizing or restructuring to fill the gap created by federal 
under-enforcement. 
Enforcement level among these states as a group was 
down. These fourteen states with no discernible changes 
between 2014 and 2018 had a 16% decrease overall in the 
number of enforcement actions resolved. The states in the 
control group employed almost the exact same strategies 
across the board. The few changes were mostly where a state 
saw a slight uptick in enforcement or a larger monetary 











Types of Relief Pursued by States
State 2014 State 2018
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“outsourcer” with two enforcement actions modeled after 
multistate cases that South Carolina did not join in 2014 to 
a non-enforcer with no enforcement actions in 2018. But even 
with the level of enforcement changing slightly, the strategy 
there remained consistent in that the state itself was not 
enforcing UDAP cases.107 
b. Breaking Down the States by Interruptions 
Given that the level of enforcement was up overall but 
down in the states with no discernible changes, the next 
question is which changes had the greatest effect on level of 
enforcement. Authors of the 2014 study, including the author 
of this study, suggested that certain internal or external 
factors might drive enforcement strategy, for example, 
budgets, statutory variances and changes, or the structure of 
the body charged with enforcement.108 Now that there are 
two years of data over a span of time, we can begin to analyze 
that data by comparing it as organized by some of the 
postulated factors. This section compares the data for states 
that encountered some form of interruption between 2014 
and 2018 to analyze whether certain types of interruptions 
tend to affect case volumes or strategies of enforcement. 
i. Internal Interruptions 
Two categories of change agents or interruptions 
occurred among the states since 2014. The first category is 
best described as internally driven interruptions (internal, 
that is, with respect to the state’s enforcement office; 
interruptions possibly influenced by outside factors but 
intentionally, affirmatively affected from within the office). 
This category applied to the subset of states with enforcers 
that made strong public pronouncements and otherwise took 
steps to shift priorities, increase budgets, or restructure 
internal departments to prioritize consumer protection in 
 
 107. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 89 (describing South Carolina as 
“[o]utsourcing . . . the case theory and development if not the representation”). 
 108. Id. at 102–03. 
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order to fill the gap created by the Trump Administration’s 
CFPB.109 These states include Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Virginia, Maryland, California, and New York.110 Within this 
subset of states, overall enforcement levels were up 171%: 
higher than the overall data (9%) and directionally different 
than the control group as a whole. 
In 2017, Pennsylvania announced its new consumer 
protection unit, headed by a former CFPB attorney.111 The 
unit remains within the AG’s office, but focuses on 
enforcement against “lenders that prey on seniors, families 
with students, and military service members, including for-
profit colleges and mortgage and student loan servicers.”112 
The 2018 data reflects this new priority, showing a 145% 
increase in case volume and a move from a “street cop” 
strategy to a “heavy” strategy.113 
In 2018, New Jersey launched a similar internally 
focused “state level CFPB.”114 That year, New Jersey 
 
 109. See Letter from Eric T. Schneiderman, Att’y Gen., State of New York, to 
Donald J. Trump, President, United States (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www 
.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/12/sign_on 
_letter_re_cfpb.pdf (signed by fifteen additional state Attorneys General and DC’s 
Attorney General) [hereinafter Attorneys General Letter]; see also Attorney 
General Grewal Announces New Leadership at the Division of Consumer Affairs, 
N.J. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.nj.gov/governor/news 
/news/562018/approved/20180327c_newleadership.shtml (describing steps taken 
to create state level CFPB) [hereinafter Grewal Press Release]; Attorney General 
Herring Expresses Unwavering Support for Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, VA. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.oag.state.va.us 
/media-center/news-releases/1101-december-12-2017-ag-herring-expresses-
unwavering-support-for-consumer-financial-protection-bureau. 
 110. See sources cited supra note 109. 
 111. E.g., Ben Lane, Mini-CFPB? Pennsylvania Attorney General Launches 
Consumer Financial Protection Unit, HOUSINGWIRE (July 21, 2017, 5:31 PM), 
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/40758-mini-cfpb-pennsylvania-attorney-
general-launches-consumer-financial-protection-unit/. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See supra Section II.B (defining these strategies). 
 114. See Grewal Press Release, supra note 109. 
1184 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
increased its level of enforcement by 509%.115 New Jersey 
also continued to employ a similar strategy even while 
launching a new priority. The strategy employed by New 
Jersey does not, however, mimic the former CFPB 
enforcement strategy. Formerly grouped in the “outsider” 
strategy, New Jersey tended to prioritize government money 
over public compensation.116 True to this strategy, New 
Jersey received public compensation in only 20% of resolved 
cases, comparatively low for overall cases in 2018 (51%).117 
Virginia also took steps to prioritize consumer protection 
enforcement by establishing a predatory lending 
enforcement unit in 2016.118 Virginia likewise showed an 
increase in its level of enforcement in 2018, up 333%. 
Notably, Virginia seemed to target payday lending and other 
credit services, presumably a result of its newly established 
predatory lending enforcement unit. Virginia also behaved 
most in line with the original CFPB strategy, with injunctive 
relief focused on training, strong public compensation, and 
high amounts of government money. 
 The Maryland AG’s office also prioritized filling the gap 
created by federal under-enforcement. Here, the office led 
efforts to amend its consumer protection statute to 
incorporate many changes designed to strengthen the ability 
of the state enforcer to fill the enforcement gap.119 Notably, 
 
 115. New Jersey resolved eleven UDAP enforcement cases in 2014. The 
number of resolved cases rose to sixty-seven in 2018. That number may have been 
artificially high, as the number of resolved cases then decreased to twenty-six in 
2019. 
 116. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 97. 
 117. Researchers coded New Jersey cases for both years since the mini-CFPB 
initiative was announced mid-2018. In 2018, New Jersey received public 
compensation in 20% of its resolved cases. In 2019, that rate climbed slightly to 
27%. 
 118. OAG Completes Reorganization and Expansion of Consumer Protection 
Operation, VA. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://oag.state.va.us 
/media-center/news-releases/842-november-21-2016-oag-completes-
reorganization-and-expansion-of-consumer-protection-operation. 
 119. See S.B. 1068, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018). 
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Maryland codified the expansion of UDAP protection to 
include abusive practices, remedied some common UDAP 
weaknesses, introduced a priority on student loans, and 
incorporated a research and education component to increase 
data collection toward improving outcomes.120 Maryland’s 
legislative changes go beyond the internal staffing and 
priority-setting and attempt to bring Maryland’s statutory 
authority to the level of the cohesive approach to consumer 
protection seen in Dodd-Frank. These legislative changes did 
not take effect until October 2018, however, so they are not 
entirely reflected in the 2018 resolved cases. Even so, 
Maryland increased its level of enforcement 100% in 2018, 
and it continued to employ a strategy aligned with the 
“heavy” category. 
California and New York enforcers have worked with 
their governors to focus on budgetary increases that would 
take effect in 2020 or beyond.121 These budgetary increases 
are not reflected in the 2018 data, but they are noteworthy 
in that these proposals reflect concrete attempts to re-
structure the state enforcer’s authority to be able to act more 
like the CFPB.122 California’s legislative proposal, the 
California Consumer Financial Protection Law, passed on 
August 31, 2020.123 California’s law is the most thorough of 
the state CFPB plans to date. The law creates a new agency, 
the Department of Financial Protection and Innovation, 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Suzanne Martindale & Michael McCauley, California Lawmakers 
Approve Budget Proposal to Create Financial Watchdog for Consumers, 
CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 1, 2020), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org 
/press_release/california-lawmakers-approve-budget-proposal-to-create-
financial-watchdog-for-consumers/; see also Corinne Ramey, New York, 
California Want More Power Over the Financial Sector, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16, 
2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-california-want-more-
power-over-the-financial-sector-11584351002; GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM, 
GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 2020–21, at 173–74 (2020), http://www.ebudget.ca 
.gov/2020-21/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf. 
 122. See GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM, supra note 121, at 173–74; see also Ramey, 
supra note 121. 
 123. H.R. 1864, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020). 
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which will have the same UDAP authority that Dodd-Frank 
delegates to the CFPB, including the full array of remedies 
and rule-making authority. New York’s legislative proposal 
ultimately did not pass in the 2020-2021 budget.124 Neither 
California nor New York increased their level of enforcement 
in 2018. 
Overall, these states have all taken steps to prioritize 
consumer enforcement and the result shows that the 
majority of these states greatly increased their enforcement 
level since 2014 even as they remained in line with their 
same strategies from 2014. Thus, these states continued to 
act in many ways as they did in 2014, bringing cases typical 
of state enforcement: smaller-dollar defendants with the 
typical injunctions received by states,125 variable public 
compensation,126 and, generally, a high percentage of civil 
penalties.127 The industries and types of scams targeted also 
appear to be consistent with general state enforcement 
strategies seen previously, including many smaller 
defendants in areas like construction, auto sales, and gyms. 
While any enforcement increase is undoubtedly a 
positive thing for a state’s consumers, a simple increase in 
the type of actions typical of state enforcers does not 
necessarily fill the unique gap created by the CFPB’s 
withdrawal from the consumer protection field. The original 
 
 124. See S.B. 7508B, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020). 
 125. New Jersey and New York stand out here for their strong injunctive relief. 
New Jersey received a business ban in almost all cases, while New York received 
multiple types of injunctive relief in each case, focusing most on stopping the 
fraudulent practice. 
 126. While Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania remained in the street cop 
plus or heavy strategy and received public compensation in a majority of cases, 
New Jersey continued its outlier strategy that prioritizes government money. 
New Jersey received public compensation in roughly 20% of cases in 2018 and 
27% of cases in 2019. This remains an outlier among the states, and especially 
among the “mini-CFPB” states. New York also had a slightly lower public 
compensation rate of 36% of cases. 
 127. New York was a bit of an outlier among this subgroup, receiving civil 
penalties in only 29% of cases. 
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CFPB strategy was a clear one: enforcement against large 
banking and credit entities with the full arsenal of relief. 
That is a powerful strategy and one that states are not as 
equipped to fill on their own, no matter how many actions 
they bring. However, the state legislative and budgetary 
changes in the pipeline hold great potential. 
ii. External Interruptions 
In addition to internally driven interruptions, the other 
type of change agent or interruption that we might expect to 
have an effect on state enforcement strategy is characterized 
by external elements changing the authority or 
characteristics of the enforcer, for example, a new AG taking 
office, a change in statutory authority, or a change in the 
institutional authority of the primary enforcer. Between 
2014 and 2018, all of these changes occurred. The effects of 
such changes on UDAP enforcement, however, were mixed. 
Leadership changes were the most common external 
interruption. Of the thirty-eight states in the 2018 data, 
twenty-one states had an AG change between study periods. 
Of those twenty-one new AGs, six also brought a partisan 
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subset, enforcement levels were up 26%. Strategies, 
however, remained similar, even with a change in party. 
Three states had changes to their statutory authority 
between 2014 and 2018.128 Maryland’s statutory change was 
discussed above, as it was instituted in conjunction with the 
internal policy-setting of the AG’s office. The Arkansas 
legislature made a series of changes to its UDAP law 
specifically seeming to target private rights of action.129 
Consumer protection advocates rightly characterized these 
changes as anti-consumer.130 Public enforcement in 
Arkansas, however, was up 200% in 2018, from three 
resolved cases in 2014 to nine resolved cases in 2018. This 
finding introduces yet another indication of the complex 
ecosystem of UDAP enforcement beyond public enforcement, 
that is, the role and influence of the private enforcers. This 
influence, however, is beyond the scope of this data. 
In Georgia, the primary enforcer for UDAP claims in 
2014 was the Georgia Office of Consumer Protection. In 
2016, authority shifted to the AG’s office through legislative 
amendment.131 In this case, the level of enforcement 
remained the same, but the strategy changed slightly. In 
2018, Georgia received public compensation in only 33% of 
 
 128. The Maryland legislature amended the statute in the middle of 2018, so 
is not referenced specifically for statutory change in terms of the 2018 data. 
However, the Maryland changes were legislative codifications of a professed 
policy to fill the gap created by the under-enforcement of the CFPB, so this 
priority-shifting of the office is captured in the internal changes described above. 
See AG Frosh to President Trump: Mulvaney’s Attacks on CFPB Should 
Disqualify Him from Leading Agency, MD. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/press/2017/121217.pdf. 
 129. In 2017, Arkansas amended its UDAP statute to require a showing of 
reliance in order to bring a private cause of action. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-
113(f) (2017). 
 130. See Allen H. Denson & Latif Zaman, States’ Divergent Approaches to 
Unfair, Deceptive, and Abusive Acts and Practices Reveal Consumer Protection 
Priorities, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups 
/business_law/publications/blt/2019/09/abusive-acts/. 
 131. See S.B. 148, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). 
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its resolved cases. This is a low rate of public compensation 
for a “street cop plus,” and indicates a slight shift in strategy. 
Washington, DC, poses a curious example. In 2014, DC 
amended the structure of how its AG is chosen. In 2014, the 
AG had been appointed by the mayor. In 2018, the AG was 
an elected position. In this case, the AG himself did not 
change, but how he was installed changed. The DC AG’s 
office went from resolving zero enforcement actions in 2014 
to resolving six actions in 2018. Since the leadership did not 
change, only the mechanism by which he gained office, it 
raises a question about the role that the AG selection method 
plays in setting enforcement priorities. 
c. Multi-Enforcers 
One last subset of the state data more directly addresses 
the complex dynamics of UDAP enforcement: multi-enforcer 
actions. In 2014, there were fifteen actions resolved by states 
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CFPB.132 Ten of these were small, multi-enforcer actions 
made up of one to three states and a federal enforcer.133 The 
remaining five cases with federal involvement were joined 
with the larger multistate actions.134 
In 2018, there was noticeably less federal involvement in 
all levels of multi-enforcer actions. The FTC resolved eight 
small multi-enforcer UDAP cases in conjunction with one 
state. The CFPB had no multi-enforcer involvement 
whatsoever. Federal enforcers did not join in any large 
multistate actions in 2018. 
There were twelve multistate actions with no federal 
involvement resolved in 2018, up from eight in 2014. 
However, more of these cases, 72%, were large multistate 
actions, involving forty or more states. In 2014 only 38% of 
the multistate actions were large.135 An increase in cases, 
however, does not necessarily mean more money back to 
consumers. As with the single-state actions in 2018, the 
percentage of cases receiving public compensation decreased. 
While 71% of the large multistate cases resolved in 2014 
received public compensation, only 44% of these cases 
received public compensation in 2018.136 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
Data matter. We need to understand how the primary 
consumer protection laws are being enforced in order to 
target solutions that will hold bad actors accountable and, by 
so doing, create an economy where consumers can begin to 
rise out of debt. Research—on the nature of the problem and 
on the viability of strategies for solving it—relies on data to 
form and test interventions. 
 
 132. Cox et al., supra note 8, at 58–59. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. at 70. 
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The data reveal that, in some instances, we must focus 
on increasing the case volume of enforcement. This is 
particularly true for the federal enforcers and the state non-
enforcers. We need a strong CFPB. 
But even among the state enforcers expanding their 
enforcement efforts, attention is needed. For example, the 
states attempting to marshal their resources in such a way 
that might fill the gap left by federal non-enforcement are 
clearly taking steps to increase enforcement. UDAP laws and 
the history of their enforcement are grounded in two goals: 
stopping the fraudulent act and returning money to 
consumers. The current landscape is trending toward fewer 
actions resulting in money to consumers overall, even with 
ramped-up enforcement levels. The data reveal we need to 
focus attention on increasing the percentage of cases 
receiving public compensation. This was down across all 
enforcers in 2018. 
The data also continue to discredit some of the common 
attacks against public UDAP enforcement. For example, 
critics continue to claim that outside counsel is a major 
problem in UDAP enforcement, even in the face of data 
showing otherwise.137 Another repeated criticism of state 
AGs is that they are primarily motivated by personal 
political concerns. As the comparative data reveal, a state 
AG’s strategy of UDAP enforcement tends to hold steady 
even through leadership and party changes. While the newer 
focus from some state AGs on filling the gap of federal under- 
or non-enforcement might be cast as having some political 
valance, it is not indicative of the general criticism of a more 
personal, transactional type politics.138 
 
 137. See generally Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney 
General Enforcement of Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging 
Concerns and Solutions, 65 KAN. L. REV. 209 (2016). 
 138. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 40 (describing criticism of state AG 
enforcement as driven by personal gain). 
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Further, it does not appear in the data that UDAP 
enforcement at the state level is driven by partisan politics. 
We see from both sets of data that the strategies do not 
neatly sort themselves into traditional red state/blue state 
divides.139 The states reflect less partisanship overall. States 
that saw a change in AG political party between 2014 and 
2018 saw changes, and sometimes dramatic changes. But 
there was not any clear ideological pattern. This agrees 
with—and validates—the 2014 data. Protecting consumers 
from scams does not seem to be an overwhelmingly 
ideological point at the state level. 
At the same time, there are ideological and partisan 
dynamic effects throughout the larger enforcement 
landscape. For example, the Trump Administration 
campaigned on loosening regulations and relaxing 
enforcement on banks. At the federal level, clashing 
ideologies between the Obama CFPB and the Trump CFPB 
are stark. This ideological divide had ripple effects 
throughout the system, likely driving the general increase in 
state enforcement that we see in 2018 and certainly driving 
the actions of the state AGs that are prioritizing filling the 
enforcement gap. We also see a retrenchment from federal 
involvement in multi-enforcer enforcement actions. 
Finally, a recent criticism emerging as AGs shine a light 
on federal under-enforcement is that AGs will prioritize large 
nationally focused cases to the detriment of their state 
consumers who are being harmed by the smaller-dollar, local 
fraud that is so pervasive.140 Again, the data directly refute 
this concern. The states that are most vocal about filling in 
 
 139. See id. at 65–66. 
 140. Elysa M. Dishman, Enforcement Piggybacking and Multistate Actions, 
2019 B.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 443 (“While it may be necessary in some instances to 
have overlapping actions, more often in the context of major corporate fraud, 
there is a danger of over-enforcing these types of actions at the expense of 
pursuing other actions. The overenforcement in this category of actions means 
that, with scarce enforcement resources, other types of actions will go under-
enforced, such as small-scale fraudsters, Ponzi schemes, and other less splashy 
but important enforcement areas.”). 
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the gap are instead increasing enforcement across the board, 
both the localized smaller dollar fraud as well as the larger 
national fraudulent schemes. 
CONCLUSION 
This study is meant to provide comparative data to build 
on and contextualize the findings from the 2014 data. With 
two years of data, separated by a major federal change in 
priorities, we can begin to understand some of the complex 
strands of influence and policy that might underlie UDAP 
enforcement. The data clarify that many criticisms of state 
AG enforcement, often framed in terms of corruption and 
political ambition, do not seem to reflect the actual 
enforcement practices of the states. The debate over public 
enforcement instead needs to be re-centered on the vital 
consumer protection role UDAP statutes play in people’s 
lives and well-being, how to encourage a robust and 
accountable diverse uniformity of state enforcement, and the 
continuity of relationship between the federal and state 
enforcers. The data presented here will allow stakeholders to 
implement strategies that will strengthen UDAP protection 
and, most importantly, continue to return money to 
defrauded consumers. As it was a decade ago when then-
Professor Elizabeth Warren was writing about the need for a 
unified federal enforcement strategy, enforcement 
effectiveness must be judged at least in part based on how 
well it stops the most disruptive defendants and makes a 
difference in people’s lives.141 
 
 141. Elizabeth Warren, Warren Outlines CFPB’s Mission for Consumers, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2011, at 10, 103. 
